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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

I.

NATURE OF THE CASE.

Appellant Neil Campbell ("Campbell") was convicted of thirteen counts of contempt
punishable by criminal sanctions ("Criminal Contempt") for testifying falsely during a sworn
debtor's examination taken by Respondents C&M Investment Group, LTD and Karlin Holdings
Limited Partnership (collectively, "Respondents").

Campbell was also found guilty of two

factually unrelated counts of contempt punishable by civil sanctions ("Civil Contempt") due to
his failure to produce documents that the court had ordered him to produce. Only the Criminal
Contempt sentence is at issue in this appeal. In this regard, Campbell challenges only the
sentence-he does 11ot challenge the district court's findings.

Citing Idaho Rule of Civil

Procedure 75(i)(2)(D) ("Rule 75(i)(2f') as well as United States and Idaho Constitutional
privileges against self-incrimination ("Privileges"), Campbell maintains that the district court
was foreclosed from imposing the 65 day jail sentence for Campbell's contempt because
Campbell was required to take the witness stand on unrelated Civil Contempt charges thatwithout objection from Campbell- were tried together with the Criminal Charges. On this basis
alone, Campbell aims to vacate the jail sentence sanction. Campbell is incorrect and the sanction
should stand for two reasons.
First, as the district court recognized and Campbell does not assert otherwise, the Civil
and Criminal contempt counts were factually unrelated. This, of course, makes for a different
case than the ones to which Campbell relies, namely, trials of factually related civil and criminal
counts. As to the discrete Criminal Contempt counts, Campbell was given the right not to take
the stand. As to the unrelated Civil Contempt counts, Campbell was ordered to take the stand
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but nevertheless given the right to invoke the Privileges, which he did, albeit with

negative

inferences drawn solely as to the Civil Contempt counts. As even Campbell acknowledged, had
the civil counts been tried during a separate proceeding, the district court could permissibly
compel Campbell to take the witness stand and be examined as to the facts underlying the civil
contempt counts. Reporter's Transcript on Appeal ("Tr.") Vol. I, p. 256, L. 11-13.
Second, all of the above aside, any error of which Campbell complains was harmless and
not grounds for reversal. Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc. v. MRI Assocs., LLP, 157 Idaho
106, 122 (2014) ("A party alleging error on appeal must also show that the alleged errors were
prejudicial"). Indeed, Campbell does not articulate in his brief on appeal how having to take the
stand created any prejudice given that the district court permitted Campbell to assert the
Privileges on the stand (which Campbell did) without prejudice to the Criminal Contempt counts.
Moreover, in the context of a bench trial, the judge is presumed to have relied on only competent
evidence and disregarded incompetent evidence. State v. Powell, 120 Idaho 707, 710 (1991).
And here, the district court expressly stated that its findings of fact regarding the Criminal
Contempt counts were

1101

based on Campbell taking the stand. Thus, Campbell was not

prejudiced and any alleged error is harmless.
II.

COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS/STATEMENT OF FACTS.

The contempt proceeding giving rise to this appeal derives from a judgment entered
against Campbell and for Respondents by a Los Angeles Superior Court for over $24 million.
("Judgment").

The Judgment represented a combination of compensatory and enhanced

damages for breach of contract, fraud and RICO violations committed by Campbell in the course
of his business relationship with the Respondents. Clerk's Record on Appeal ("R."), p. 489
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(Contempt Judgment

,r 12);

R., pp. 285- 306 & 306- 11 (Am. RJN Exs. F & G). During the

litigation, Campbell repeatedly flouted the discovery process- including by refusing to respond
to written discovery and failing to attend his deposition. R., p. 489 (Contempt Judgment ,r,r l 011 ); R., pp. 278- 80 & 281- 84 (Am. RJN Ex. D & E). Campbell's discovery abuses were
sufficiently egregious that the California court imposed monetary sanctions, terminating
sanctions, struck Campbell's answer, and entered a default against him. R., p. 489 (Contempt
Judgment ,r,r 10-1); R., pp. 278- 80 (Am. RJN Ex. D); R., pp. 281- 84 (Am. RJN Ex. E); R., p.
188 (Am. RJN Ex. F. at 2). 1 Later, Campbell was found guilty of a felony by a Los Angeles jury
as a result of his fraud on the Respondents.
On June 21, 2012, after filing the California Judgment in Idaho, Plaintiffs obtained an
order from the district court domesticating the Judgment in Idaho.

R., p. 489 (Contempt

Judgment ,r 13); Pis.' Trial Ex. 12. On March 23, 2015, the district court granted Respondents'
Motion for a Judgment Debtor's Examination. R., p. 489 (Contempt Judgment

,r 14);

Def. 's

Trial Ex. 511. The district court amended this order twice, first on April 1, 2015, and again on
August 3, 2015, to change the date for the debtor's examination. R., pp. 489- 90 (Contempt
Judgment ,r 14); Pis.' Trial Ex. 13; Def.'s Trial Exs. 512 & 513.

A.

Facts Relating to the Civil Contempt Charges.

The Amended Order compelling Campbell to appear for a debtor's examination also
required Campbell to produce, inter alia, documents "evidencing any payments made by
Defendant to any legal counsel over the period of 2009 to present, including documents

The facts underlying the Judgment are recited by the district court in its Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law. R., pp. 488- 89 (Contempt Judgment ,i,i 6- 9).
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evidencing the source of the funds used to make those payments," and "all records relating to
financial accounts (savings accounts, checking accounts, or otherwise) maintained in
Defendant's name or to which Defendant has access for the time period commencing January 1,
2012 to the present date." R., p. 490 (Contempt Judgment ,r 15); Pis.' Trial Ex. 13-2 & 13-3.
The Amended Order required Campbell to produce the responsive documents no later than April
13, 2015. R., p. 490 (Contempt Judgment

,r 16); Pis.'

Trial Ex. 13-2. Campbell was initially

charged with ten counts of Civil Contempt for failure to produce responsive documents. R., pp.
32- 33. Following Campbell's untimely production of additional documents, only two of those
counts were tried.
At trial, Campbell was called to testify about his failure to produce two categories of
records: (1) documents evidencing his payments to one of his lawyers, David Flyer; and (2)
documents relating to a bank account he opened at HSBC in Hong Kong. Tr. Vol. I, p. 160~L.
22 - p. 201, L. 25. He was also examined about the completeness of his recent production of the
documents at issue in civil contempt Charges Two through Seven, which Respondents then
dismissed. Id.; R., p. 488 {Contempt Judgment ,r 6). The district court found Campbell guilty of
two counts of civil contempt for failing to produce documents related to his payments to Flyer
and documents relating to the HSBC Hong Kong account. R., pp. 494-99, 530-31 (Contempt
Judgment ,r,r 37- 69, 176- 85).

B.

Facts Relating to the Criminal Contempt Charges.

On August 24, 2015, Campbell appeared before the district court for a debtor's
examination. R., p. 500 (Contempt Judgment ,r 71); Pis.' Trial Ex. 1-4. The court put Campbell
under oath prior to the debtor's examination. R., p. 500 {Contempt Judgment ,r 71); Pis.' Trial
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Ex. 1-3.

During the examination, Respondents' counsel asked Campbell a series of basic

questions about his finances and living situation. To nearly every one of these questions,
Campbell responded "I don't know" or "I don't remember." R., p. 500 {Contempt Judgment

172).
Because of Campbell's false sworn testimony, Respondents brought 23 separate Criminal
Contempt charges against Campbell pursuant to Idaho Code § 7-601(4), which provides that
deceit by a party to a special proceeding constitutes a contempt of court. Each of the criminal
contempt charges set forth in the Charging Affidavit related solely to Campbell's untruthful
testimony during his August 24, 2015 debtor's examination. R., pp. 33-47. The charged lies
relate to (a) the source of funds Campbell used to open his Bank of America account, his car, and
where he lived (Counts 11- 17); {b) the source of a large cash deposit to Campbell's Bank of
America Account (Count 18); (c) Campbell's claim that he did not remember the name of the
company in whose name he opened the HSBC Hong Kong account (Count 19); (d) the source of
large cash deposits to Campbell's Zions bank account {Counts 20-30); and (e) how Campbell
paid his rent during a time when his bank records did not reflect payments (Counts 31- 34).

C.

The Trial.

On February 1, 2016, Plaintiffs filed the Charging Affidavit setting forth Civil Contempt
counts (for failure to produce documents) and Criminal Contempt counts (stemming from
Campbell's sworn lies). R., pp. 486- 87 (Contempt Judgment 12). On February 22, 2016, the
district court held a hearing at which the court informed Campbell of all of the counts against
him and advised him of his rights, including his right to remain silent. R., p. 487 (Contempt
Judgment 13). In May 2016, the Court appointed counsel to represent Campbell. R., p. 153.

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF - 5

11!S9.001

Prior to trial, the parties engaged in motion practice. At no time did Campbell move to bifurcate
the civil and criminal contempt charges. R., pp. 7- 9; Tr. Vol. I, p. 256, L. 22-25.
The district court held a bench trial on July 26 to July 27, 2016, during which the court
heard both the Civil and Criminal Contempt counts.

R., p. 487 (Contempt Judgment ,i 5).

During the trial, Respondents called Campbell as a witness to testify as to the Civil Contempt
counts. R., p. 488 (Contempt Judgment ,i 6). The district court permitted this over Campbell's
objections because it correctly found that the Civil and Criminal Contempt counts were factually
distinct. Tr. Vol. I, p. 157, L. 22 - p. 158, L. 4. As the district court recognized, Campbell was
questioned solely regarding the Civil Contempt counts. Respondents' counsel made "no attempt
to cross-examine Campbell on the criminal contempt charges." R., p. 488 (Contempt Judgment ,i
6).

Moreover, Campbell was given the right to invoke the Privileges during this limited

questioning and did in fact invoke the Privileges. R., p. 499 (Contempt Judgment ,i 70). The
district court expressly stated that it did not draw from Campbell's invocation of the Privileges
any negative inferences related to the Criminal Contempt counts. Id.
After reviewing the evidence, on November 3, 2016, the district court issued written
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. See generally R. pp. 486-544 (Contempt Judgment).
The district court found Campbell guilty of two counts of Civil Contempt and thirteen counts of
Criminal Contempt. R., p. 542 (Contempt Judgment ,i,i 222 & 223). In reaching its findings of
fact as to the Criminal Contempt counts, the court expressly stated that "[t]he following findings
of fact [regarding the criminal contempt charges] are based solely on the documentary evidence
admitted or judicially noticed during trial.

They are not based in any way on Campbell's

testimony during trial (which related only to the civil contempt counts)." R., p. 499 (Contempt
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Judgment

,r 70).

This documentary evidence included bank statements, check images, and

Campbell's own written statement provided to Respondents before the trial. See, e.g., Pis.' Trial
Exs. 3 to 6.
On December 1, 2016, the district court sentenced Campbell to serve five (5) days in the
Blaine County Jail for each of the thirteen counts of Criminal Contempt on which he was found
guilty, for a total of sixty-five (65) days. 2 R, pp. 602- 06. Campbell then filed a Motion to Stay
Execution of Judgment. After a hearing was conducted, the Court stayed the sentence it imposed
on the thirteen counts of Criminal Contempt of Court pending the outcome of Campbell's
appeal.
COUNTERSTATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

1. Did the district court not err by imposing a Criminal Contempt sanction in a bench trial that
did not require Campbell to take the stand as to Criminal Contempt Charges and solely
required Campbell to take the stand without prejudice to Campbell asserting the Privileges
as to factually unrelated Civil Contempt charges that Campbell did not request be tried
separately?
2. Assuming it was error for the district court to require Campbell to take the stand as to the
Civil Contempt Charges, should the district court's order imposing a Criminal Contempt
sentence be affirmed because such error has not been shown and could not be shown to be
prejudicial in light of the circumstances?

2

As to the civil counts, the court also sentenced Campbell to jail pending his compliance with
certain conditions. The jail sentence was initially stayed, and Campbell ultimately complied with
the conditions without being incarcerated.
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ARGUMENT

I.

STANDARD OF REVIEW.

The "standard of review applicable to questions of law is one of deference to factual
findings, but [the Court may] freely examine whether statutory and constitutional requirements
have been met in light of the facts as found." State v. Hedges, 143 Idaho 884, 886 (2007).
Additionally, "[a] party alleging error on appeal must also show that the alleged errors were
prejudicial. Alleged errors not affecting substantial rights will be disregarded." Saint Alphonsus
Diversified Care, 157 Idaho at 122 (internal quotations omitted); see also Idaho R. Civ. P. 61
("At every stage of the proceeding, the court must disregard all errors and defects that do not
affect any party's substantial rights."). Errors affecting constitutional rights are harmless where
the court finds beyond a reasonable doubt that the alleged error did not impact the outcome of
the case. State v. Christiansen, 144 Idaho 463, 471 (2007) (violation of criminal defendant's
Fourth Amendment rights was harmless error). Issues not raised in an opening brief are waived.
Tucker v. State, 162 Idaho 11, 61 (2017).
Here, the district court's factual findings that the criminal and civil contempt charges
were factually independent and that its findings regarding the criminal contempt charges were
unrelated to Campbell's testimony are entitled to deference. Staggie v. Idaho Falls Consol.
Hosps., Inc., 110 Idaho 349, 351 (Ct. App. 1986) (appellate courts defer to trial court's factual
findings unless clearly erroneous).
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II.

THE DISTRICT COURT HONORED CAMPBELL'S RIGHT AGAINST
SELF-INCRIMINATION AS TO THE CRIMINAL CONTEMPT
CHARGES IN A TRIAL INVOLVING DISTINCT AND UNRELATED
CIVIL CONTEMPT CHARGES.

Campbell argues that, under Rule 75(i)(2), no criminal sanction can be imposed against
him because he was called to the stand during the contempt trial. Rule 75(i)(2) provides as
follows: "Trial Rights Required to Impose a Criminal Sanction. The court cannot impose a
criminal sanction following a trial unless the respondent was provided the following rights: ...
(D) the privilege against self-incrimination[.]" Idaho R. Civ. P. 75(i)(2).
Rule 75(i)(2) provides a right against self-incrimination 011/y as to charges of criminal
contempt. It does not provide that same protection for charges of civil contempt. As Campbell's
own attorney admitted, "if it was only a civil contempt case, he takes the stand and has the
potential to invoke the Fifth Amendment" as to particular questions. Tr. Vol. I, p. 256, L. 11-13.
The district court expressly found that the Civil and Criminal contempt charges were factually
distinct. Id. at p. 157, L. 22 - p. 158, L. 4. As discussed above, the Criminal Contempt charges
stemmed from Campbell's lies about his finances and related issues. R., pp. 33-47. These
charges were unrelated to whether Campbell had the ability to produce the documents that the
court ordered him to produce.

In contrast, the Civil Contempt charges related solely to

Campbell's failure to produce documents. R., pp. 29- 33. As such, the district court permitted
Respondents to call Campbell to testify solely as to the Civil Contempt charges. Tr. Vol. I, p.
137, L. 21-25, p. 158, L. 5-8.3 In other words, the district court permitted Respondents to do

3

Campbell knew by no later than the February 2016 Charging Affidavit that the contempt trial
involved both criminal and civil contempt charges. R., pp. 29-47. He also knew that he could be
called as a witness to testify regarding the civil contempt charges. Despite this knowledge, he
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exactly what even Campbell admits would have been proper if the Civil Contempt charges had
been tried separately.
In the Contempt Judgment, the district court specifically found that Respondents'
examination was "limited to questions related to the civil contempt charges" and Respondents
"made no attempt to cross-examine Campbell on the criminal contempt charges." R., pp. 488,
499 (Contempt Judgment 116, 70). The court also issued separate findings of fact as to the Civil
and Criminal Contempt charges, and expressly stated that its findings of fact as to the Criminal
Contempt charges were "based solely on the documentary evidence admitted or judicially
noticed during trial" and were "not based in any way on Campbell's testimony during trial[.]"
R., p. 499 (Contempt Judgment 1 70). This documentary evidence included bank statements,
check images, and Campbell's own written statement provided to Respondents before the trial.

See, e.g., Pis.' Trial Exs. 3 to 6. These documents showed that Campbell told numerous lies
about such topics as the source of funds that he used to open an account at Bank of America,
whether he owned a car in 2012, where he was living in 2012, whether he remembered the name
of the company in whose name Campbell opened the HSBC Hong Kong account, what assets he
had upon moving to Idaho, and how he paid his rent at a time when his bank records did not
reflect payment. The evidence used to prove that Campbell lied was not associated with his
taking the stand, any testimony he gave on the stand, his invocation of the Privileges while on
the stand, or even his failure to produce documents. Campbell was afforded the full right against
self-incrimination to which he was entitled under Rule 75(i)(2).

never requested to have bifurcate the civil and criminal contempt charges. He therefore waived
this argument.
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Campbell does not point to any contrary authority. Instead, the primary case on which he
relies deal with criminal sanctions imposed for civil contempt charges. See Camp v. E. Fork

Ditch Co., 137 Idaho 850, 865 (2002) (court erred where it announced at the outset of
proceedings that charges were civil, never advised contemnor that criminal punishment could be
imposed, and nevertheless imposed criminal sanction for those contempt charges). Campbell
also relies on out-of-context dicta from State Department of Health & Welfare v. Slane, 155
Idaho 274, 277 (2013). In Slane, the Court noted that "[i]f both civil and criminal relief are
imposed in the same proceeding, then the 'criminal feature of the order is dominant and fixes its
character for purposes of review."

Slane, however, did not involve a trial for factually

independent charges of criminal and civil contempt. Rather, Slane involved a contempt sanction
that the district court incorrectly treated as a civil contempt sanction when it was in fact a
criminal sanction. Here, the district court correctly found that the civil and criminal contempt
sanctions were factually distinct and, therefore, that Respondents could call Campbell to testify
solely as to the civil contempt counts. This court should therefore affirm the district court's
orders finding Campbell guilty of thirteen counts of criminal contempt and sentencing him to 65
days in jail.

III.

CAMPBELL WAS NOT PREJUDICED AS TO THE CRIMINAL
CONTEMPT CHARGES BY VIRTUE OF TAKING THE STAND.

As noted above, a showing of prejudice is required for the district court's Criminal
Contempt sentence to be vacated. See Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, LLP, 157 Idaho at 122
(district court's order affirmed where alleged error did not cause any prejudice to appellant).
Campbell's right against self-incrimination was respected and he was not prejudiced by any
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alleged error.
At bottom, the issue boils down to the Court requiring Campbell to take the stand and
exercise the Privileges with respect to the Civil Contempt charges in open court, as opposed to
not taking the stand. Campbell makes no argument on appeal that that this prejudiced him. Nor
could he.
First, Campbell was allowed to and did invoke the Privileges when he took the stand.
Moreover, in the case of a bench trial, there is no concern that the mere act of taking the stand
prejudiced Campbell. Second, the district court expressly found that Campbell was not asked
any questions related to the criminal contempt charges, that its findings of fact as to the criminal
contempt charges were not based in any way on Campbell's testimony during trial, and that its
findings of fact as to the criminal contempt charges were based solely on the documentary
evidence admitted or judicially noticed during trial. R., p. 499 (Contempt Judgment

,r

70).

Indeed, the judge in a bench trial is presumed to consider only competent evidence and disregard
any incompetent evidence. Powell, 120 Idaho at 710. Finally, had the Civil Contempt counts
been tried separately from the Criminal Contempt counts, the same district court trying the latter
would have witnessed Campbell taking the stand and assert the Privileges in the former trial.
There is no reason to believe that any effect on the fact finder under this scenario- a scenario
that Campbell concedes would have been entirely proper-- would be any different than in the
trial that was had.
Even if the district court erred by allowing Respondents to call Campbell to testify as to
the civil contempt charges, any such error had no effect on the outcome of the trial as to the
criminal contempt charges. Therefore, any error was harmless and the district court's order
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should be affirmed.

IV.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Respondents respectfully request that the Court affirm the
district court's Contempt Judgment and Sentencing Order.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this _ ~_ day of March 2018.

Erin Farrell Clark
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

L

day of March, 2018, I caused to be served a true
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this
copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed to each of the
following:
Neil D. Campbell
P.O. Box 3372
Ketchum, ID 83340

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF ~ 14

V

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
_ _ Overnight Mail
_ _ Telecopy
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